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Sender-Receiver Games

Ronald Peetersy Jos Pottersz
May 1999
Abstract
Standard game-theoretic solution concepts do not guarantee meaningful commu-
nication in cheap-talk games. In this paper, we dene a solution concept which
guarantees communication for a large class of games by designing a behavior pro-
tocol which the receiver uses to judge messages sent by the sender on acceptability.
For that, we will make use of the Nash equilibrium concept for which truth-telling
is a consequence. Uniqueness is nevertheless not a consequence, but after reasonable
selection it is. Further, we will come to a method to compute all equilibria very
easily.
JEL classication: C72, D82.
Keywords: Noncooperative game theory, Signalling, Sender-Receiver games.
Introduction
In signalling games the importance of the fact that the parties understand what the signals
mean is often underestimated. Many authors give a hint in the story companying their
model but in the model itself this fact is very often suppressed. In Cho and Kreps' beer-
and-quiche game for instance (see Cho and Kreps (1987)) the fact that `drinking beer' is
a signal of a `strong type' can only be derived indirectly from the fact that the payo for
a strong type `drinking beer' is higher than for a strong type `eating quiche'. The story
becomes less intriguing but clarity would have been served if the signals would have been
`I am strong/weak' under the condition that `lying' is costly. If parties in a conict try to
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give a signal by `burning money' (Van Damme (1989), Hurkens (1995)) it should be clear
what this signal means (`I do not frighten away from blackmailing you?') and that it has
something to do with the decisions that follow. This is especially urgent, if the signal is not
given but could have been given. In Crawford and Sobel (1982) it is mentioned in passing
that the signal y is a `noisy estimate' of the real value of a variable m. By the way, the
word `noise' is here used in the unusual sense that the informed player causes the noise
deliberately: he is telling the truth but not the whole truth. In sender-receiver games the
messages sent by the sender are meant to convey information about the type of the sender
to the benet of both players. In the model the messages are just points in a message
space and the only distinction between messages is the cost of sending the message. Very
often this is not enough to convey any information.
If every message can tell everything, no message is telling anything.
Some recent papers on sender-receiver games (e.g. Rabin (1990), Farrell (1993), Zapater
(1993)) recognize this fact and an a priori relation between a message and the information
that can be transmitted by the message, is assumed: messages are like letters, they contain
information. We see this as a necessary extension of the theory, not because of the little
predictive power of the theory (`everything goes') but because it predicts something that
will not (cannot) occur (without assuming that the receiver is `clairvoyant' and then there
is no need for messages). Another tendency one can observe in the more recent literature
on signalling games is the choice for rationalizability concepts instead of Nash equilibrium
concepts to explain behavior (see e.g. Hurkens (1995)). Also Rabin advocates this idea
eloquently. In the theory followed in this paper we return, at a higher level, to Nash
equilibrium behavior.
In this paper we will formulate a theory for communication between rational agents and
we will use the theory in the paper of Rabin (1990) as a `piece de resistence' for our theory.
Partially we will go along with Rabin's theory. We shall agree with him in the following
points:
(1) Messages are bearers of information and not just points in a message space. There
must be an a priori relation between messages and types. Messages are telling some-
thing about the type of the player. Rabin emphasizes that the same information can
be conveyed by dierent messages and that mostly more natural language is used
than prosaic statements as \My type is a type from S". In our opinion dierent mes-
sages conveying the same information can be identied without any problem. Not
the phrasing of the information is important but the information itself. Moreover,
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using more natural language often implies more ambiguity. Many interpretations of
a message are possible. A message like \You should invest in my company" (Rabin)
can interpreted as \Given my type, it is a good (better or the best?) action for you
(or for me?) that you invest in my company". In this paper we will assume that only
the prosaic but unambiguous messages \My type is a type from S" (in the sequel
denoted by [S]) are available.
(2) The main issue is the formulation of behavior rules according to which the credibility
of messages can be determined. In Rabin's theory this part is played by |what
he calls| credible message proles. We will introduce acceptable message proles
(AMP's) and completely acceptable message proles (CAMP's). The idea behind
both concepts is the same: it must be safe for the receiver of the message `to believe
the messages in the prole'.
(3) In Rabin's theory there is essentially only one credible message prole. In our theory
we end up with a unique maximal CAMP for a generic class of games.
It is here that important dierences between the two theories appear, namely:
(1') The denition of (completely) acceptable message proles rests on Nash equilibrium
behavior. It is not necessary that every (selected) message `triggers' the best action
for the types mentioned in the message but that it induces the best action for the
types sending the message among the actions that can be induced by a message in the
prole (under the assumption that the receiver believes the messages in the message
prole and only these messages) and that the receiver does not regret his credulity.
In a credible message prole the types mentioned in the messages of the prole are,
by denition, telling the truth and therefore dierent messages mention disjoint sets
of types. Types, not mentioned in any message of the prole, can do whatever they
like, because their choice does not inuence the receiver's choice of action. We do not
assume that the messages in a prole are disjoint or that types tell the truth. This
will be a consequence of the denition of a (completely) acceptable message prole
as a Nash equilibrium.
(2') A second dierence with Rabin's theory lies in the fact that we do not need a message
prole theory that selects (by iterated strong dominance) the rationalizable strategy
tuples from the strategy tuples `admitted by the credible message prole'. Nash
behavior is always rationalizable. We, however, select from the completely acceptable
message proles the one that gives the receiver the maximal payo.
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As `the proof of the pudding is in eating it', we will frequently compare the predictions
made by Rabin's theory with the outcomes of our method. In fact, a bit prematurely, the
dierences can be illustrated by two very simple examples.
Example 1 (Rabin (1990), Example 8)
a1 a2 a3
t1 10 0 8
t2 6 8 0
a1 a2 a3
t1 10 4 0
t2 0 0 4




In this example there are two types t1 and t2. The rst matrix gives the payos to the
sender, the second matrix the payos to the receiver. Rabin's theory predicts that type t1
will always induce action a1 and that type t2 does also induce action a1 but might try to
do better with an other message. The question is, what other message? According to the
theory we will develop in the next sections there are two possible message proles, namely
f[t1]; [t2]g and f[T ]g. Under the rst message prole type t1 triggers (i.e. send [t1], the
message is believed and the best response is chosen by the receiver) the action a1 and t2
triggers the action a3. Both types prefer the outcome corresponding with a1 and f[t1]; [t2]g
is not a CAMP. Only the message prole f[T ]g remains. Anyhow, type t2 cannot induce
the receiver to use the weakly dominated action a2.
Example 2 (Rabin (1990), Example 9)
a1 a2 a3
t1 2 -1 0
t2 -1 -2 0
a1 a2 a3
t1 3 0 2
t2 0 3 2




Rabin claims that all types induce action a3. Further he deems the message [t1] not to be a
credible message. By the way, it should be noted that Rabin returns here to a (restricted)
Nash behavior. We nd in this example one CAMP: f[T ]g with payo vector [(0; 0); 2].
The reader may wonder why the message [t1] is not acceptable. Sending the message [t1]
will trigger the action a1, if the receiver believes that the chance that type t1 is sending
this message is higher than 2
3
. So he has to nd out what message type t2 would have sent.
As well by sending [t2] as by sending [T ] type t2 would betray his type (if type t1 sends
message [t1] with high probability). So sending the message [t1] and thereby `destroying'




A sender-receiver game is a 2-person strategic game with incomplete information. Player 1
is the sender and has one of nitely many types t 2 T . Player 1 knows his type. Player 2
is the receiver; he does not know the type of the sender but he has an a priori probability
distribution p = pT > 0 on the set of types T which is also known by the sender. The
receiver chooses an action a from a nite set of actions A. The payo to player 1 is Ut;a,
if his type is t and the action a is chosen. For player 2 the payo is Vt;a.
It may be protable for both players, if the sender reveals some information about his
type and he has a nite setM of messages at his disposal to do so. Sometimes it is assumed
that messages are costly, i.e. there is a cost function c:M ! R+ . In this paper we will
assume that messages are costless (c = 0). We collect the payos in two T  A-matrices
U = (Ut;a) and V = (Vt;a). So, the problem is given by
hp 2 (T ); U; V :T  A! R;Mi:
If we model this situation, naively, as a Bayesian game, the strategy space of player 1
consists of the set of stochastic T M -matrices X and the strategies of player 2 are the
stochastic M  A-matrices Y , i.e.
X = (Xt;m)t2T;m2M with X  0 and
X
m2M
Xt;m = 1 for all types t
Y = (Ym;a)m2M;a2A with Y  0 and
X
a2A
Ym;a = 1 for all messages m:
The number Xt;m denotes the probability that type t sends message m. The interpretation
of the numbers Ym;a is similar.
If player 1 and player 2 play the strategies X and Y , respectively, the stochastic T A-
matrix Z(X; Y ): = X  Y gives the probabilities that type t is met by action a. So, type t
of player 1 maximizes




and player 2 maximizes







The set of Bayesian equilibria consists of the Nash equilibria of the jT j + 1-person `agent
normal form game'. This nonempty set inherits from his 2-person origin the property to
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be the irredundant union of nitely many maximal convex (and exchangeable) subsets, the
so-called Nash components (see Borm et al. (1996)).
For use later on, we remind the reader that the pure best responses to a strategy X can
be found by Bayesian inference: for a message m 2M we dene the conditional probability





The best reaction to message m is an action that maximizes a! V ( Xm; a).
However, as many authors have argued (cf. a.o. Rabin (1990), Farrell (1993)), Nash
equilibria do not explain how the communication between the agents takes place. To make
this point clear, let us consider the following situation:




In this situation of common interests it is clear that type t1 will try to convince player 2
to play a1 and that type t2 will do the same with action a2. Moreover, player 2 will
be easily convinced. So, dierent types must send dierent messages to communicate
their types. And, in fact, the strategy X in which dierent types send dierent messages
together with the strategy Y wherein player 2 `understands the message' and chooses the
appropriate actions is a Nash equilibrium. It is however unclear how player 2 will be able
to `understand the message'. Let us assume that there are three messages called `blue',
`red' and `yellow' and that type t1 sends message `blue' and type t2 sends message `red'.
Then player 2 has to infer that `blue' means t1 and `red' means t2 but he will not be able
to do so, as it could also be the other way around that `red' means type t1 and `blue' type
t2 (also forming a Nash equilibrium with the right guess of player 2). Even if we assume
that sending messages is costly, these messages can not discriminate between these two
symmetric types. There must be an a priori relation between types and messages. The
most obvious solution for this problem is to see messages as `bearers of information', they
contain information, preferably about the types of player 1. Maybe that is the reason why
in daily life people do not just send an envelope of a particular color with the appropriate
number of stamps on it (a costly message) but put a letter in it:
The medium, even if it is an expensive medium, is not the message.
In the literature many lines are devoted to necessary conditions that make communication
between agents possible. Players should `share a meaningful suciently rich vocabulary'
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and `have a common understanding to interpret statements according to their literal mean-
ing' (Farrell (1993)). We do not discuss these issues. Certainly, they are interesting, just
as the observation of Rabin (1990) that `messages should come from a common language
pre-dating the specic strategic situation (...) with which the agents can richly describe
all relevant strategic issues' and `that agents, most likely, will use more natural language,
such as \You should invest in my company.".' This is, however, not the subject of this
paper.
In fact, we will make a short-cut by saying that the agents have a communication chan-
nel with sucient possibilities. So, if player 1 uses a certain language (or smoke signals),
player 2 understands the language (or the smoke signals). If player 1 uses metaphors or a
code, player 2 understands the metaphors or has a decoding mechanism.
If player 2 does not get all the information he wants to have, the reason is not
the insuciency of the communication channel but player 1's unwillingness to
give him that information.
In the sequel we will even assume that the message space consists solely of the unambiguous
messages [S] saying \My type is one of the types in S" for S 2 2Tnf;g. The message [T ] is
used to convey no new information. Therefore, it is not necessary for player 1 `to babble',
`to speak gibberish' or `to remain silent'; he can simply use the message [T ], in case he
does not want to convey information.
After we have removed the possible insuciency or ambiguity of the communication
channel (and not earlier), the real issue of the paper emerges: the credibility of messages.
After player 2 has found out what player 1 is telling him about his (player 1's) type, he
has to decide if he can trust the information he has obtained. Before we come to this issue,
we will answer two related questions, namely what will player 2 do, if he does not get any
`credible' information and what, if he gets the information [S] and believes the message?
We assume that both players are expected utility maximizers and that both players are,
moreover, Bayesian players. Accordingly, if player 2 gets no (new) credible information,
he will play an action aT that maximizes
P
t2T p(t)Vt;a; if he gets the information [S] and
he has no reason for doubt, he will maximize
P
t2T pS(t)Vt;a. By pS we mean the `Bayesian
update' of p under the condition that t 2 S is true (believed). To make things easier we
assume that, for all S 2 2Tnf;g, the function a!
P
t2T pS(t)Vt;a has exactly one optimal
action aS and also that for each type t 2 T the values of Ut;a are dierent. We call such a
triple generic. Almost all triples (p; U; V ) satisfy these conditions, i.e. any triple (p; U; V )
can be made generic by an arbitrary small perturbation of (p; U; V ).
We call the action aT (in fact, `always choosing aT whatever the message may be') the
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default strategy of player 2. For player 1 the default strategy is `sending the message [T ]
whatever his type may be'. Note that the pair of default strategies form a Nash equilibrium
(as deviating behavior of one of the players is not rewarded by the other player), and that
the players have a common interest to do better than the default strategy. That is the only
reason why player 1 takes the eort (and maybe the cost) to send a message and player 2
tests the messages on credibility. By transferring the information [S], player 1 tries to
convince player 2 to deviate from the default action aT to aS. So, player 2 must formulate
some behavior rules saying how he investigates the credibility of messages [S] given the
information (p; U; V ). These rules should be formulated without any reference to a specic
game and should be applicable to every specic game. Furthermore, player 1 must know
how player 2 comes to his judgement. He must know the behavior protocol.
So, we come to the following chronology:
t=0 The players get acquainted with each other's way of expressing themselves, learn a
common language rich enough to communicate messages like \My type is a type in
S".
t=1 Player 2 tells player 1 how he will form his opinion about the credibility of messages,
his behavior protocol. Here the common language is challenged more seriously. One
may fear that smoke signals are no longer adequate.
t=2 Player 1 and 2 learn the type space T , the action space A, the payo matrices U and
V and the a priori probability distribution p. Here the common meeting ends.
t=3 Player 1 is informed privately about his type. Player 2 knows that this happens.
t=4 Player 1 sends a message [S] from M = 2Tnf;g and player 2 receives the message
and learns that player 1 tries to convince him to deviate from the default action aT
to aS.
t=5 Player 2 forms his opinion about the credibility of [S] by using the earlier communi-
cated decision rules (see t = 1).
t=6 and acts accordingly.
Stage t = 0 may be deleted, if the players know that they will understand each other, and
stage t = 6 is an automatism. We will use the word `trigger' or `induce' for the combination
of the steps t = 5 and t = 6. The remaining issue is the formulation of player 2's behavior
protocol that he tells player 1 in stage t = 1, that player 1 will use to select his message in
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stage t = 4 and that player 2 will use in stage t = 5.
A part of the protocol has been written already, namely that both players are Bayesian
players who maximize expected utility. Being a paradigm in game theory and in many
economic theories, we assume that the players do not have any problem to believe these
statements. Notice, however, that also the main part of the protocol, how to form an opin-
ion about the credibility of messages, should be convincing for both players. In particular,
player 1 should be convinced that player 2 will really apply his protocol in stage t = 5.
Then he can use it to anticipate player 2's behavior in stage t = 4. To make anticipation
possible it is necessary that player 1 knows that player 2 accepts or does not accept a mes-
sage as a credible message and not something in between. The behavior protocol should
not introduce a new kind of ambiguity.
Remark 1 Up to now we called accepted messages credible. But, in fact, player 2 is not
interested in the truth of a message (that a type sending a message [S] is indeed a member
of S) but that it is protable for him to accept [S] and to switch from the default action aT
to action aS. He is an expected utility maximizer and not a searcher for truth. Therefore,
we will call messages that pass player 2's tests acceptable instead of credible.
2 Acceptable message proles
In Rabin (1990) a formulation of a possible behavior protocol can be found. It is called a
credible message prole. The author puts, however, severe restrictions on credible messages
with the consequence that in many examples where you would expect some meaningful
communication, this turns out to be impossible. The main property of a credible message
(prole) that the author requires, is the optimality of the chosen action aS for all types
mentioned in the message [S]. In our opinion this is a too severe restriction. If both
players can gain with respect to the default equilibrium payo, they may also have reasons
to send and to believe some messages. This is the idea we will try to elaborate in the present
paper. With the previously mentioned papers it will have in common that the acceptability
of messages can not be derived from the message alone but only from the message as a
member of a family of other acceptable messages. The reason to call a message acceptable
is partially found in the presence of other acceptable messages. To avoid even the slightest
suspicion of an innite regress we introduce the concept of an acceptable message prole.
Before we come to the denition of an acceptable message prole, we introduce the
following notation:
a t a if Ut;a  Ut;a and a 

t a if Vt;a  Vt;a:
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The meaning is: if a t a and player 1 has type t, he weakly prefers action a to action a;
if a t a and player 2 thinks that the type of player 1 is t, he weakly prefers action a to
action a. As we assume that (p; U; V ) are generic, the relations t and 

t are asymmetric.
Let C be any non-empty collection of messages in M . Then we dene a strategy for player
2, Acc C :M ! A (accept the messages in C and no other), by
Acc C([S]) :=
(
aS if [S] 2 C
aT if [S] 62 C
:
If player 1 knows that player 2 will accept the messages from C and none of the messages
outside C, each of his types will send a message [S] that triggers the best action (aS) of
the actions that can be induced by a message from C or by a not acceptable message. We
call such a strategy Rev C : T !M (reveal your type according to C):
Rev C(t) = [S] =)
(
aS t a S for all [ S] 2 C and aS t aT if [S] 2 C
aT t a S for all [ S] 2 C if [S] 62 C
:
Then each of the strategies Rev C is, by denition, a best response to Acc C.













; i = 1; 2; 3:
All types of player 1 prefer action a1 to the default action a0. The messages [t1; t2], [t2] and
[t2; t3] are the messages that trigger action a1. If these messages are elements of a message
prole C, every strategy in which each type sends one of these messages is an element of
Rev C.
In fact, we restrict the domain of Rev C to strategies in which types who want the same
action, send the same message, i.e. if RevC(t) = [S] and Rev C(t
0) = [S 0] with aS = aS0,
then [S] = [S 0]. So, in Example 3 all types send message [t1; t2] or [t2] or [t2; t3]. The idea
is that each message triggering action a is only sent with the purpose to induce a. There is
no additional information sent. Or, to say it dierently each message [S] will be considered
to contain the information \play aS" and not to contain any residual information. In the
example the message [t2] can be sent by each of the types. Truth telling is not focal, if
this implies residual information e.g. my type is with high probability t2, if [t2] is sent in
Example 3.
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Denition 2.1 A collection C is called an acceptable message prole, if Acc C is also a best
response to the strategies Rev C , i.e. if (Rev C;AccC) is a Nash equilibrium.
Although this concept does not solve the communication problem between the players,
it is at least a rst stepping stone in the uncertain world of communication. If player 2
believes the messages from C and no other messages and player 1 plays a best response
to that strategy, player 2 will, after all, be justied to have believed the messages from C.
Acceptable message proles are viable ways of communication, once the players can agree
upon the choice of an acceptable message prole without any further communication.
We will address this important issue later on. First we will investigate the merits of an
acceptable message prole.
The following proposition shows the remarkable fact that every acceptable message prole
generates an acceptable message prole T (C) with the same payos as C in which every
type is `telling the truth' and the messages mention disjoint sets of types.
If C is a message prole and a is an action from A we dene T (a j C) to be the set of
types ft : Rev C(t) triggers the action ag. Let AC be the set of actions a with T (a j C) 6= ;.
The message prole T (C) consists of the messages [T (a j C)] for all a 2 AC. Note that
T (a j C) is not dependent on the choice of Rev C.
Proposition 2.2 (a) Let C be any message prole. Then the best responses to any Rev C
are the strategies with [S]! aT (aS j C) if aS 2 AC.
(b) C is an acceptable message prole if and only if aS = aT (aS j C) for all messages [S] 2 C
with aS 2 AC.
(c) If C is an acceptable message prole, T (C) is also an acceptable message prole with
the same payos for both players. The acceptable message prole T (C) has the additional
properties that t sends message [T (a j C)] if and only if t 2 T (a j C) (`truth telling') and
that dierent messages mention disjoint sets of types.
Proof (a) If Rev C is played by the sender and player 2 receives the message [S], his
updated belief over the types is pT (aS j C) and, by denition, aT (aS j C) is the best reaction to
that belief. The reaction to messages never sent is immaterial.
(b) This follows immediately from (a).
(c) The types sending the message [S] in Rev C, will send the message [T (aS j C)] in
Rev T (C), as aS is also induced by the message [T (aS j C)] and the actions that can be
triggered by any message from T (C) is a subset of faS : [S] 2 Cg [ faTg. The reaction
of the receiver to [S] in Acc C , namely aS, is the same as the reaction of the receiver to
[T (a j C)] in Acc T (C), because (Rev C; Acc C) is an equilibrium (apply (b)). Then it is clear
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from (a) that Acc T (C) is a best response to Rev T (C). /
From Proposition 2.2, (c) follows that we can restrict the attention to acceptable message
proles in which all types tell the truth and dierent messages mention disjoint sets of types.
Every payo vector generated by an acceptable message prole can also be generated by
an acceptable message prole with these additional properties.
Denition 2.3 We call acceptable message proles in which all types tell the truth and
dierent messages never contain the same type completely acceptable message proles
(CAMP).
Here we show a slight preference for truth telling:
If the same result can be reached by being honest as well as by being dishonest,
we assume that players prefer honesty.
An additional advantage is that there are less CAMP's and it may be easier to nd all of
them.
In the next proposition we prove that in antagonistic games (i.e. if a t b is equivalent to
b t a for all t 2 T and all a; b 2 A), only the message prole C: = f[T ]g is completely
acceptable. For common interest games (i.e. if a t b is equivalent to a 

t b for all
t 2 T and all a; b 2 A), there is only one completely acceptable message prole in which
all types reveal all relevant information. This is not necessarily the `separating' message
prole C0: = f[t] : t 2 Tg, since dierent types may have the same most preferred action.
Proposition 2.4 (a) In an antagonistic game only the message prole f[T ]g is com-
pletely acceptable.
(b) In a common interest game there is exactly one completely acceptable message prole
that guarantees all types of player 1 their highest payo.
Proof (a) Let (U; V ) be the payo matrices in a generic antagonistic game. We prove
that no prole C with more than one element is completely acceptable. Let [S] and [S 0]
be two dierent (and therefore disjoint) messages from a completely acceptable message
prole C. If aS = aS0 , then S[S
0
 T (aS j C) and all types in S[S
0 send the same message.
Then the types in S or the types in S 0 do not tell the truth. If aS 6= aS0, the types in S
prefer aS to aS0 and for the types in S
0 the opposite preference holds. For player 2 the
preferences are opposite and therefore, it is better for player 2 to respond [S] with aS0 and
[S 0] with aS. The strategy AccC is not a best response.
(b) Every type t has exactly one best action a(t). Collect the types with the same best
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action as t in a set R(t). Consider the message prole C: = f[R(t)] : t 2 Tg. Then the
messages in C induce a partition on T , the message [R(t)] triggers the action a(t), i.e.
aR(t) = a(t) (by common interest) and therefore the types in R(t) send the message [R(t)]
to obtain their highest payo. Therefore, T (C) = C. So, the message prole C is completely
acceptable.
Let C 0 be a dierent completely acceptable message prole also triggering the best
action for each type and [R] is a message from C 0. All types in R must have the same
best action and therefore R  R(t) for some type t. If there is no equality, there is a type
in R(t), triggering the action a(t) by means of a dierent message [R0] 2 C 0. Then also
R0  R(t). So, R [ R0  T (a(t) j C 0) and the types in R [ R0 send the same message in
RevC0. Then some type is not telling the truth. /
3 Some examples and the behavior protocol.
In the following examples we compute completely acceptable message proles in a rather
ad hoc way. In Section 4 we will do it in a more systematic way.
We assume, in all examples, that all types have the same probabilities. We only give
the U - and V -matrix. If a payo has an upper index , it means that the payo is slightly
larger than the given number (to make the example generic). Most of the examples are
from Rabin (1990).
Example 4 (Rabin (1990), Example 1)
a1 a2 a3
t1 10 0* 0
t2 0 10 5
t3 0 10 5
a1 a2 a3
t1 10* 0 0
t2 0 10 7
t3 0 0 7
For the moment we assume that all messages will be believed.
t1 : a1  a2  a3 [t1]; [t1; t2]; [t1; t3]  ! a1
t2 : a2  a3  a1 [t2]  ! a2
t3 : a2  a3  a1 [t3]; [t2; t3]; [T ]  ! a3
The rst block gives the preferences of the types, the second block the actions `triggered'
by the messages. The rst inconsistency with a completely acceptable message prole lies
in the fact that t3 will send message [t2] to trigger his most preferred action a2. He will do
so, as long as [t2] is available. So, we have to delete [t2]. So, under truth-telling type t2 can
only send [t2; t3] or [T ] to trigger his second best action a3 and type t3 can do the same.
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Then type t1 will send [t1] and the types t2 and t3 will send truthfully the message [t2; t3].
Both of them could also send [t3] or [T ]. This gives an acceptable but not a completely
acceptable message prole. There are two completely acceptable message proles, namely
C0: = f[T ]g and C1: = f[t1]; [t2; t3]g. The latter one is more protable for both players.
Rabin comes to the conclusion that the message [t1] is credible and that the message [t2] is
incredible. The credibility of [t2; t3] is not commented upon. We think Rabin would reject
this message because some type does not get his highest payo.
Example 5 (Rabin (1990), Example 2)
a1 a2 a3
t1 1 -2 0
t2 -2 -1 0
a1 a2 a3
t1 3 0 2
t2 0 3 2
t1 : a1( [t1])  a3( [T ])  a2( [t2])
t2 : a3( [T ])  a2( [t2])  a1( [t1])
If message [T ] is in the message prole, type t2 will send this message. If we delete [T ],
we get the message prole C1: = f[t1]; [t2]g. This is not a completely acceptable message
prole, since type t2 will send the not-acceptable message [T ]. Rabin's theory predicts
that the types will reveal themselves, even when some types would prefer that no such
revelation takes place. We come to the opposite conclusion: type t2 would not allow type
t1 to reveal himself or at least player 2 has reasons to mistrust message [t1] too.
Example 6 (Rabin (1990), Example 5)
a0 a1 a2 a3
t1 -1 7 6 0
t2 -1 6 7 0
t3 -1 0* 0 6
a0 a1 a2 a3
t1 5 6* 7 0
t2 5 7 6 0
t3 5 0* 0 6
We give the preferences of the types and the messages that trigger these actions:
t1 : a1( [t2]; [t1; t2])  a2( [t1])  a3( [t3])  a0( [t1; t3]; [t2; t3]; [T ])
t2 : a2( [t1])  a1( [t2]; [t1; t2])  a3( [t3])  a0( [t1; t3]; [t2; t3]; [T ])
t3 : a3( [t3])  a1( [t2]; [t1; t2])  a2( [t1])  a0( [t1; t3]; [t2; t3]; [T ])
The messages [t1] and [t2] will used by the types t2 and t1, respectively. Both messages
must be deleted to obtain a completely acceptable message prole. So, the best the sender
can get is action a1 for the types t1 and t2 by sending the message [t1; t2] and action a3
for type t3 by message [t3]. Rabin concludes that the types strongly prefer to reveal if the
type is t3 or not. This is exactly what our theory predicts.
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Example 7 (Rabin (1990), Example 10)
a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
t1 0 10 0* 0 5 -1 -1 -1 -1
t2 0 5 10 0* 0 -1 -1 -1 -1
t3 0 0 5 10 0* -1 -1 -1 -1
t4 0 0* 0 5 10 -1 -1 -1 -1
a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
t1 3 4 0 0 4 5 0 0 0
t2 3 4 4 0 0 0 5 0 0
t3 3 0 4 4 0 0 0 5 0
t4 3 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 5
t1 : a1( [t1; t2])  a4( [t1; t4])  : : :
t2 : a2( [t2; t3])  a1( [t1; t2])  : : :
t3 : a3( [t3; t4])  a2( [t2; t3])  : : :
t4 : a4( [t1; t4])  a3( [t3; t4])  : : :
If we want to keep the message [t1; t2] in a completely acceptable message prole, the
messages [t2; t3] and [t1; t4] must be removed and we nd the completely acceptable message
prole C1: = f[t1; t2]; [t3; t4]g. Also the message prole C2: = f[t2; t3]; [t1; t4]g is completely
acceptable. The union of these two proles, however, is not acceptable. If C = C1 [ C2 is
used for communication, Acc C is not a best response to Rev C: T (C) = f[t1]; [t2]; [t3]; [t4]g.
Here we see a quite serious problem to deal with. There is more than one CAMP and
some types, namely t1 and t3, prefer to use message prole C1 and the other types, t2 and
t4, prefer message prole C2. Rabin believes that the fully pooling equilibrium is a very
plausible equilibrium in this game. Our conclusion is dierent, for the moment. Although
there are problems (see Remark 2), the players should at least try to coordinate on one of
the two CAMP's.
All these examples give us an indication for a senseful behavior rule for player 2.
No message [S] will be accepted unless there is a completely acceptable message
prole containing [S].
Remark 2 If a message [S] is a member of two dierent completely acceptable message
proles, the reaction of player 2 will be the same. So, it is not important for player 2 to
know which completely acceptable message prole player 1 has in mind but it is important
for him to know that all types of player 1 use the same completely acceptable message
prole. He has, however, no means to check this and dierent types have an incentive to
use dierent (completely acceptable) message proles. In Example 7 e.g. we have seen
that the types t1 and t3 prefer C1 and that the types t2 and t4 like to use C2.
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Because the receiver determines the behavior protocol, he is not willing to coordinate on
a certain message prole if there is another one that gives him a better payo. He is only
willing to coordinate on a CAMP if there is no other CAMP which is better (in payo) for
him. We will call such a CAMP maximal.
Note that most triples (p; U; V ) admit only one maximal CAMP, meaning that every
triple with more than one maximal CAMP can be transformed into a triple with only one
maximal CAMP by an arbitrarily small perturbation of V . So, having only one maximal
CAMP is a generic property.
Summarizing the assumptions made with respect to the behavior of both players we come
to the following behavior protocol:
(1) Both players maximize expected utility and are Bayesian players.
(2) Player 2 will accept a message if and only if it is a member of the maximal completely
acceptable message prole.
(3) If a message [S] is accepted, player 2 will choose action aS; if a message is not
accepted, the default action aT is chosen. So, messages triggering the same action
are considered to be equivalent; there is no residual information.
In order to handle the behavior rules adequately both players must be able to determine all
(maximal) completely acceptable message proles. How they can nd them is the subject
of the next section.
4 Determining completely acceptable message pro-
les.
In this section we will show how the players can determine the completely acceptable
message proles. We start with an undirected graph. The node set N consists of messages
[S] with aS t aT for all t 2 S. If a message [S] contains a type t with aT t aS, such
a type prefers to send any not acceptable message (triggering aT ) to [S]. We connect two
dierent messages [S] and [S 0] if the messages are `compatible' in the sense that they can
occur together in the same CAMP. There are two conditions to be satised. The rst
condition is S \ S 0 = ;. This implies e.g. that the message [T ] cannot be connected
with any other message. The second condition that connected messages must satisfy is
that none of them undermines the credibility of the other, where we say that message [S 0]
undermines (the credibility of) message [S] if there is a type t 2 S such that aS0 t aS. In
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the graph obtained in this way we look for maximal cliques. A clique is a subset of nodes
of which each pair is connected. They form a complete subgraph. A clique is maximal if it
cannot be extended to a larger clique.
Proposition 4.1 If the messages in a clique form a partition of T , they form a completely
acceptable message prole and conversely every completely acceptable message prole is a
maximal clique in the graph just dened.
Proof In a completely acceptable message prole the messages are disjoint, there is no
type t occurring in a message [S] 2 C with aT t aS or a pair of message [S] and [S
0] such
that aS0 t aS for some type t 2 S. We must also exclude aS0 t aS for a type t 2 S. As
(p; U; V ) are supposed to be generic, we nd aS0 = aS. Under RevC types triggering the
same action are supposed to send the same message. Then there are types in S or in S 0
not telling the truth.
Conversely, we must prove that a maximal clique that forms a partition gives a com-
pletely acceptable message prole. Suppose the messages [S1], [S2]; : : : ; [Sq] form a maxi-
mal clique and
Sq
i=1 Si = T . For all types t in Si we have aSi t aSj for j 6= i (Sj does not
undermine Si) and aSi t aT (otherwise [Si] was not a node of the graph). Let C be the
message prole consisting of the messages [Si] for i = 1; : : : ; q. Note that dierent mes-
sages trigger dierent actions. At most one of these actions is aT . If none of the messages
trigger aT , every type t 2 Si sends the message [Si] and T (C) = C. Then C is an acceptable
message prole by Proposition 2.2 and every type tells the truth. Since C is also a partition
of T , it is a completely acceptable message prole. If aSi = aT for an index i, then all
types in Si strictly prefer the default action aT to all attainable actions aSj (j 6= i). Under
RevC they will all send message [Si] or the same not acceptable message. Whatever they
send, the receiver will response with aT (= aSi). By consequence, (RevC;AccC) is a Nash
equilibrium. So, also in this case we nd a completely acceptable message prole. /
In Example 4 the nodes of the graph are the messages [t1], [t2], [t3], [t2; t3] and [T ], because
aT = a3 t2 a1 = aft1;t2g and aT = a3 t2 a1 = aft1;t3g. Further, aft2g = a2 t3 a3 = aft3g,
which implies that in the graph the node [t2] is not connected with the node [t3]. So, we














We see that the graph contains two maximal cliques covering T , namely C0 = f[T ]g and
C1 = f[t1]; [t2; t3]g. Note that these collections are the same as found earlier in an ad hoc
way. When C0 is used the (expected) payo becomes [(0; 5; 5);
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3
]; when C1 is used the
(expected) payo becomes [(10; 5; 5); 24
3
]. Obviously, C1 gives player 2 a larger payo than
C0. So, C1 is the unique maximal CAMP.
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